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I.

INTRODUCTION

Previous surveys have addressed the trend--or at least what the
author perceives to be the trend--of the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in recent years to defer to district court judges' evidentiary
decisions. This recent trend can be contrasted with the activism
displayed by Eleventh Circuit judges in decisions discussed in earlier
survey articles.' The effects of this more recent trend are fewer cases
in which the Eleventh Circuit devotes extensive examination of
evidentiary issues and, when evidentiary issues are addressed, marked
deference to district court judges. Although this trend appeared to
continue during the current survey period,2 two decisions stand in
contrast. The Eleventh Circuit's Rule 404(b) analysis in United States
v. Utter,' recalls the days when the Eleventh Circuit frequently, and
seemingly routinely, reversed convictions because of the improper
admission of Rule 404(b) evidence. In Joiner v. General Electric Co.,"

the Eleventh Circuit intensively scrutinized a district court's reasons for
excluding expert testimony pursuant to the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,' and conclud-

ed that this reasoning did not pass muster.
* Partner in the firm of Chambless, Higdon & Carson, Macon, Georgia. Valdosta State
University (B.A., 1978); Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1981). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
1. See, e.g., Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 38 MERCER L. REV. 1253 (1986); Marc T.
Treadwell, Evidence, 39 MERCER L. REV. 1259 (1987); Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 40
MERCER L. REv. 1291 (1988).
2. This Article surveys significant evidence decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and the district courts within the Eleventh
Circuit, rendered between January 1 and December 31, 1996.
3. 97 F.3d 509 (11th Cir. 1996).
4. 78 F.3d 524 (11th Cir. 1996).
5. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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II. ARTICLE I: GENERAL PROVISIONS
Rule 101 provides that the Federal Rules of Evidence "govern
proceedings in the courts of the United States."6 However, this rule of
general application is subject to exceptions, particularly in diversity
cases or other cases in which state law provides the rule of decision. In
some cases, the Rules themselves provide express exceptions. Rule 302
provides that the effect of presumptions of fact in civil actions governed
by state law must be determined in accordance with that state's law.'
Similarly, privilege and competency issues are resolved by the law of the
state providing the rule of decision.'
Even in the absence of express exceptions, the Rules sometimes must
yield to state law. In diversity actions, substantive issues are decided
in accordance with state law and procedural issues are governed by
federal procedural law. Thus, the admissibility of evidence, because it
is a procedural matter, is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence.9
However, the Rules do not apply to every evidentiary issue in diversity
cases. A state rule of evidence may apply if it concerns a matter of
"substantive law." For example, the parol evidence rule and issues
relating to burden of proof are considered substantive, and thus
governed by state law.1" Similarly, res ipsa loquitur, although a rule
of evidence, is also a matter of substantive law, and thus must be
followed by a district court in a diversity action." Unfortunately, the
determination of whether a state rule of evidence is substantive or
procedural is not always easy.
The dividing line can be said to be the point at which evidentiary rules
reflect state policy. For example, the Tenth Circuit has held that a state
law prohibiting the admission of evidence of failure to use a seat belt is
not simply a rule of evidence which "we could then ignore," but rather
is a statement of substantive law "'concerned with the channelling of
behavior outside the courtroom, and where, as in this case, the behavior
in question is regulated by state law rather than by federal law, state
law should govern even if the case happens to be in federal court.' 12

6.

FED. R. EvD. 101.

7. FED. R. EviD. 302.
8.

FED. R. EviD. 501, 601.

9. Borden, Inc. v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 772 F.2d 750 (11th Cir. 1985).
10. See Wynfield Inns v. Edward Leroux Group, Inc., 896 F.2d 483 (11th Cir. 1990);
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Marlar, 761 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1985).
11. Kicklighter v. Nails by Jannee, Inc., 616 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1980).
12. Gardner v. Chrysler Corp., 89 F.3d 729, 736 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Barron v.
Ford Motor Co., 965 F.2d 195, 199 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1001 (1992)).
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It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss in depth the many
difficult issues raised by conflicts between state evidentiary rules and
the Federal Rules of Evidence. It is, however, appropriate to note the
difficulty the Eleventh Circuit, and district courts within the Eleventh
Circuit, have faced with regard to one particular area of conflict--legislation modifying state rules of evidence to accomplish "tort
reform." At least two Alabama district courts, one of which was affirmed
by the Eleventh Circuit without opinion, have held that collateral source
rules (rules determining whether a jury may be told that a plaintiff has
received payment from "collateral sources," e.g., health insurance), which
arguably are substantive to the extent they affect the scope of recoverable damages, are really rules of evidence, and thus inapplicable in
diversity actions.13 However, when a third Alabama district court held
that the state legislature's tort reform motivated modification of the
collateral source rule was procedural, and thus not applicable in federal
court, the Eleventh Circuit, in Bradford v. Bruno's, Inc.,4 reversed,
holding that collateral source rules are substantive law and must be
applied in diversity cases."8
During the current survey period, the Eleventh Circuit revisited
Bradford' to address plaintiff's motion for rehearing in which plaintiff
asked the court to hold its opinion in abeyance pending the outcome of
state court litigation attacking the constitutionality of the modification
of the collateral source rule. As it turned out, the Alabama Supreme
Court held the statute unconstitutional. 7 Accordingly, the Eleventh
Circuit withdrew its opinion. In a substituted opinion, the court held
that the district court's decision not to apply the new collateral source
rule was correct even though its reasoning was not and, therefore,
affirmed the district court."
Notwithstanding the Eleventh Circuit's substitute opinion, it would
appear that the Eleventh Circuit has quelled the Northern District of
Alabama's revolt. Thus, for the moment at least, district courts are
bound to apply state collateral source rules. However, this raises more
questions than it answers. For example, the Georgia rule governing the
admissibility of subsequent remedial measures differs from Rule 407, the
Federal Rules provision governing the admissibility of subsequent

13.
(11th
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Craig v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 866 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D. Ala. 1993), affd, 38 F.3d 573
Cir. 1994); Killian v. Melser, 792 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Ala. 1992).
41 F.3d 625 (11th Cir. 1995), withdrawn, 94 F.3d 621 (lth Cir. 1996).
41 F.3d at 626.
Bradford v. Bruno's, Inc., 94 F.3d 621 (11th Cir. 1996).
American Legion Post No. 57 v. Leahey, 681 So. 2d 1337 (Ala. 1996).
Bradford, 94 F.3d at 623.
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Given the policy concerns undergirding the
remedial measures.'
question of whether evidence of subsequent remedial measures should
be admitted, it certainly could be argued that Georgia's decision to allow
or not allow such evidence is "substantive." Similarly, Rule 409 flatly
prohibits the admission of evidence that a party paid or offered to pay
medical, hospital, or similar expenses, but Georgia law, although
currently in a state of some confusion, arguably allows the admission of
such evidence in some circumstances as an admission of liability."
Again, Georgia's rule is based on policy intended to "channel behavior,"
that is, to encourage, or at least not discourage, citizens to compensate
those they have injured. Practitioners should be aware of the issues,
and opportunities, presented by conflicts between the Federal Rules of
Evidence and state evidentiary rules.
Rule 106, sometimes called the "rule of completeness," permits a party
to insist on the introduction of an entire document when the adverse
party has introduced only a portion of the document."' Although Rule
106 mentions documents only, the same standard applies to conversations.2 In United States v. Range,' defendant contended that the
district court improperly barred him from cross-examining the arresting
officer to establish that defendant stated to the arresting officer that a
codefendant had committed certain acts. Defendant argued that because
the government introduced a portion of his statement through the
arresting officer's testimony, he should have been allowed, pursuant to
Rule 106, to introduce the remaining portion. The Eleventh Circuit
disagreed, concluding that the remainder of the defendant's statements
were not relevant.' The Eleventh Circuit also noted that the admission of the remainder of the statement would have deprived the
codefendant of his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses
against him.2" This dilemma, the Eleventh Circuit noted, restricts the
scope of Rule 106.2" "When multiple defendants are involved and
statements have been redacted to avoid Bruton problems, the 'rule of
completeness' is 'violated only when the statement in its edited form...
effectively distorts the meaning of the statement or excludes information

19. Compare General Motors Corp. v. Moseley, 213 Ga. App. 875,447 S.E.2d 302 (1994)
with Wood v. Morbark Indus., 70 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 1996).
20. See Rosequist v. Pratt, 201 Ga. App. 45, 410 S.E.2d 316 (1991); Neubert v. Vigh,
218 Ga. App. 693, 462 S.E.2d 808 (1996).
21. FED. R. Evm. 106.
22. See United States v. Haddad, 10 F.3d 1252, 1258 (7th Cir. 1993).
23. 94 F.3d 614 (11th Cir. 1996).
24. I& at 620-21.
25. I. at 621.
26. Id.
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substantially exculpatory of the nontestifying defendant.' 27 The
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the portion of defendant's statement
admitted by the district court did not distort defendant's statement in
its entirety and, therefore, Rule 106 did not require the admission of the
remainder of the statement.'

III. ARTICLE III: PRESUMPTIONS IN CrL ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS
Federal common law recognizes the presumption that an item properly
mailed was received by the addressee. In Konst v. FloridaEast Coast
Railway," the Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of whether this
presumption could be invoked in the context of the claims procedures for
filing claims against rail carriers. In Konst, plaintiffs claimed that they
filed their claim for damages to their belongings against the railroads
transporting the belongings within the nine-month statute of limitations.
The railroads contended they never received the claim. They contended,
and the district court agreed, that the presumption of receipt is not
applicable because the "applicable federal regulation requires that claims
be filed with the carrier."" Thus, the railroads and the district court
distinguished "filing" from "receipt." However, the Eleventh Circuit
noted that the regulations imposed requirements on the railroads based
upon the receipt of the claim: "[hiaving determined that the governing
regulations contemplate receipt as the trigger for processing a claim, we
see no reason that the presumption of receipt should not apply in this
case."3 ' Although the court acknowledged that some courts had held
that the presumption of receipt could not be implied in cases involving
distinguishfiling requirements, the Eleventh Circuit found those cases
32
able on their facts, and thus reversed the district court.
Federal common law also recognizes the adverse inference presumption in civil cases when witnesses invoke their Fifth Amendment rights
not to incriminate themselves." Thus, although a witness may invoke
the Fifth Amendment in civil proceedings, the jury or the court, as trier
of fact, may infer that the witness's testimony would be harmful to the
witness. In United States v. Two Parcels of Real Property,3' appellants

27. Id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 898 F.2d 1505, 1511 n.11 (11th Cir. 1990)).
28. Id.
29. 71 F.3d 850 (11th Cir. 1996).
30. Id. at 853.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 854-55,
33. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976); United States v. Premises
Located at Route 13, 946 F.2d 749, 756 (11th Cir. 1991).
34. 92 F.3d 1123 (11th Cir. 1996).
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contended that this presumption could not be invoked in forfeiture cases.
Appellants relied upon recent decisions holding that "so-called civil
forfeiture is no longer civil and that the criminal rule should apply.""
However, the Eleventh Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's holding in
United States v. Ursery' that the double jeopardy clause is not
implicated by civil in rem forfeitures. Thus, forfeiture proceedings are
sufficiently civil in nature to allow the use of the adverse inference
presumption.
IV

ARTICLE IV: RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS

Rule 404 is the principal rule of evidence governing the admissibility
of "extrinsic act evidence"--evidence of acts and transactions other than
the one at issue.37 The rule is intended to prevent the admission of
evidence of misconduct on other occasions solely to prove that a
defendant is more likely to have committed the charged offense." As
noted in a previous survey, 9 the level of scrutiny in Rule 404(b)
determinations has seemingly become increasingly relaxed over the
years. Earlier surveys addressed cases in which the Eleventh Circuit
reviewed extrinsic act evidence in minute and painstaking detail, a
review arguably inconsistent with the abuse of discretion standard of
More recently,
review applicable to evidentiary determinations.
however, the Eleventh Circuit seems to have taken a markedly different
course, and now generally defers to the discretion of district court judges.
Arguably, however, the Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v.
Utter4° departs from this more relaxed scrutiny. In Utter, defendant,
who was convicted of charges arising from a fire at his business,
contended that the district court improperly admitted extrinsic act
evidence. The Eleventh Circuit agreed and reversed defendant's
conviction. 4' In its analysis, the Eleventh Circuit first acknowledged
35. Id. at 1129.
36. 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
37. FED. R. Evin. 404. Rule 404 governs the admissibility of extrinsic act evidence
offered for substantive purposes. Id. If the extrinsic act evidence is offered to impeach or

bolster a witness, then the admissibility of the evidence is determined by the rules found
in Article VI, principally Rule 608, which addresses the use of character evidence and
evidence of specific instances of conduct. FED. R. EvID. 608.
38. Although Rule 404(b) is not limited by its terms to criminal cases, the Rule is rarely
mentioned in civil cases, although the admissibility of extrinsic act evidence is frequently

an issue in civil cases. For example, a plaintiff in a personal irury case may proffer
evidence of prior accidents to demonstrate a defendant's notice of a defective condition.
See, e.g., Hessen v. Jaguar Cars, 915 F.2d 641 (11th Cir. 1990).
39. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 44 MERCER L. REv. 1173, 1209-10 (1992).
40. 97 F.3d 509 (11th Cir. 1996).
41. Id. at 516.
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the three-part Beechum"' test applied by the Eleventh Circuit when
First, the
considering the admission of extrinsic act evidence.'
extrinsic act evidence must be relevant to an issue other than a
defendant's character." Second, the prosecution must prove a defendant
committed the extrinsic act.45 The prosecution need not prove this
element beyond a reasonable doubt; proof by a preponderance of the
evidence is sufficient.' Third, the evidence must not contravene Rule
403, meaning that the probative value of the extrinsic act4evidence must
not be substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. '
In Utter, the district court admitted the testimony of a tenant of
defendant that the defendant threatened to "burn her out" in connection
with a rent dispute, a matter unrelated to the arson-related charges
against defendant.'
The prosecution argued that the evidence was
relevant to demonstrate defendant's reaction to financial stress,
apparently that he reacted to stress by starting fires. The Eleventh
Circuit concluded that this evidence simply showed defendant's alleged
propensity to commit arson and was not relevant to any issue at
defendant's trial.49 Specifically, the threat did not relate to insurance
fraud, the alleged scheme underlying the charged offense.5" Thus, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court abused its discretion
in admitting this testimony.5'
The prosecution also tendered, and the district court admitted, the
testimony of defendant's girlfriend concerning a fire at defendant's
previous home. At a pretrial hearing, the government represented that
the girlfriend would testify that defendant paid someone to burn his
home. 2 At trial, however, the girlfriend claimed she could not recall

42.

United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920

(1979).
43. Beechum has been applied by the Eleventh Circuit since its creation, and was
adopted by the Eleventh Circuit en banc in United States v. Miller, 959 F.2d 1535, 1538
(11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 942 (1992).
44. Miller, 959 F.2d at 1538.
45. Id.
46. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689 (1988).
47. Miller, 959 F.2d at 1538.
48. 97 F.3d at 513.
49. Id. at 515.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. The government also argued that this testimony was 'inextricably intertwined"
with the charged offense and, thus, was not extrinsic act evidence subject to Rule 404(b)
analysis. 97 F.3d at 514. This argument was based on defendant's failure to reveal the
previous fire in an application for insurance for the property burned in the charged offense.
The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument because defendant never procured insurance
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defendant's statements about the prior fire. Accordingly, the government offered no proof that defendant started the fire in his former home,
and thus, the evidence did not satisfy the second prong of the Beechum
test-the prosecution failed to prove that defendant committed the
extrinsic act." Finding this evidence highly prejudicial and concluding
that the government's case against defendant was "extremely close," the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the admission of this evidence was
harmful error."
Judge Cox dissented.ss With regard to the evidence of the prior fire,
Judge Cox argued that the district court's initial determination that the
evidence was admissible, based upon the prosecution's representation
that the girlfriend would testify that defendant paid someone to burn his
home, was clearly not an abuse of discretion." Judge Cox could not
fault the district court for the girlfriend's apparent "lapse of memory."5 '
Thus, the district court's pretrial determination that the evidence was
admissible was correct, and because that was the error complained of,
defendant's conviction should not have been reversed."
The tenant's testimony that defendant threatened to "burn her out"
was offered for the limited purpose of supporting the credibility of
witnesses who had testified about defendant's threats to burn his
business.59 Because the testimony of these witnesses was uncontradicted, Judge Cox concluded that the tenant's testimony was relatively
inconsequential and could not have substantially influenced the jury.'
Finally, Judge Cox disagreed that the case against defendant was
close. He viewed the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable
to the government, as "substantial."6 1
Essentially, the difference between the majority and the dissent seems
to be one of degree. The majority evaluated the evidence in great detail;
the dissent would defer to the trial court's discretion. In other Rule
404(b) decisions during the survey period, the Eleventh Circuit employed

pursuant to that application. Rather, the insurance in question was procured by
defendant's mortgagor. Id.
53. Id. at 514.
54. Id. at 515. Arguably, this reasoning is inconsistent with previous Eleventh Circuit
pronouncements that extrinsic act evidence is more likely to be admitted when the
government has a greater need, i.e., a weaker case.
55. Id. at 516.
56. Id. at 516-17.
57. Id. at 517.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 518.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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a more relaxed review of district court decisions to admit extrinsic act
evidence.
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Wood v. Morbark Industries,Inc.'
should be studied carefully by personal injury lawyers, and merits
extended discussion.
In Wood, plaintiff alleged that defendant's
defective wood chipper caused the death of her husband. Specifically,
she contended that the chipper's infeed chute was too short. The district
court granted defendant's motion in limine to exclude "evidence of postaccident design changes that lengthened the infeed chute."' However,
during the trial, defendant's counsel repeatedly elicited testimony
implying that the shorter chute was the safest chute available and was
still in use by the decedent's employer and other employers. At one
point during the trial, the district court ruled that defendant had opened
the door to evidence of subsequent remedial measures and allowed
plaintiff to elicit testimony from the decedent's employer that, although
it continued to use the wood chipper, a longer chute had been added.
However, at a later point in the trial, the court rebuked plaintiff's
counsel when he attempted to demonstrate, after defendant's expert
testified that the shortest chute was the "safest length chute you could
possibly put on the machine," that defendant was now selling
chippers with longer chutes. The district court also instructed the jury
to disregard any testimony concerning longer chutes. The jury found for
defendant and, on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed.'
First, however, the Eleventh Circuit rejected plaintiff's argument that
Rule 407 does not apply in strict liability cases, but rather is limited to
actions based on negligence."7 The court acknowledged that other
circuits were split on this issue, and that the Eleventh had yet to tackle
it." For now, the court was content to let the matter be. Perhaps
indicating some desire to limit the application of Rule 407 in strict
liability cases, however, the court narrowed its holding: "[clonfronted
with this precise issue today, we hold that Rule 407 does not apply in
strict products liability cases when the plaintiff alleges that a product
is defective because the design is unreasonably dangerous.'

62. United States v. Tokars, 95 F.3d 1520, 1537 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Key,
76 F.3d 350, 354 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Paradies, 98 F.3d 1266, 1291 (11th Cir.
1996).
63. 70 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 1995).
64. I& at 1203.
65. Id. at 1205.
66. Id. at 1209.
67. Id. at 1206-07.
68. Id. at 1207.
69. Id. at 1206.
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Plaintiff also argued that the Eleventh Circuit should follow Florida
law governing the admission of evidence of subsequent remedial
measures because this issue presents "a matter of state policy."7 The
court rejected this argument, holding that the Federal Rules apply to
procedural matters, including the admissibility of evidence.7
However, the court agreed that the district court abused its discretion
in its handling of plaintiff's efforts to rebut defendant's implications that
the shorter chute was still in service, had not been modified, and was
the safest chute available.
Although the district court correctly
allowed plaintiff to respond to defendant's earlier abuse of its order in
limine prohibiting the admission of subsequent remedial efforts, it
incorrectly restricted plaintiff's efforts to respond to defendant's expert's
testimony that the shorter chute was the "safest length chute you could
possibly put on the machine. 73 In response, plaintiff's counsel should
have been allowed to ask why this "supposedly safest design possible
was modified after the accident involving [plaintiff's decedent]." 74
Although the mere failure to allow an impeachment, by itself, would not
be enough to show an abuse of the trial court's discretion, the exclusion
of the evidence in conjunction with a direction to the jury to ignore such
evidence from any witness amounted to an abuse of discretion.76
The Eleventh Circuit's refusal in Morbark to limit Rule 407 to
negligence actions underscores a key difference between Rule 407 and
Georgia's Rule of Evidence governing subsequent remedial measures. In
General Motors Corp. v. Moseley,7" the Georgia Court of Appeals held
that evidence of subsequent remedial measures is admissible in strict
liability actions.77 Accordingly, lawyers representing plaintiffs in
products liability actions in which diversity jurisdiction is present should
be aware of the opportunities to expand the scope of admissible evidence,
and defendants' attorneys considering removal should be aware of
possible risk.
V. ARTICLE V: PRIVILEGES

It has long been held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination cannot be invoked by corporations, and thus cannot protect
70. Id. at 1207.
71. Id. at 1207-08. (Arguably, this conflicts with the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
Bradford, discussed above).
72. Id. at 1208.
73. Id. (citations omitted).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 213 Ga. App. 875, 447 S.E.2d 302 (1994).
77. Id. at 882, 447 S.E.2d at 309-10.
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a custodian of corporate records from producing those records. 78
However, the line between an individual's right to invoke the Fifth
Amendment and the principle that corporations cannot invoke the
privilege is not always bright. 9 In In re Grand Jury Subpoena dated
April 9, 1996 (FGJ 96-02) v. Smith,"° the Eleventh Circuit addressed
the issue of whether a corporate records custodian who is not in
possession of the records may be compelled to testify regarding their
location. In Smith, a subpoenaed corporate records custodian testified
before a grand jury that she did not have the records. When asked
where the records were, she invoked her Fifth Amendment right not to
incriminate herself. The district court ordered the custodian to testify
and, when she refused, held her in civil contempt.81
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit noted that a corporate records
custodian may not refuse to produce subpoenaed documents even though
those documents may incriminate the corporation. 2 Nor may the
custodian refuse to produce corporate records that may incriminate the
custodian." Even when the act of producing the records incriminates
the custodian, the custodian still must comply with a subpoena ordering
the production of those records." However, although the custodian
may not refuse to produce the records, he cannot be compelled to answer
questions pertaining to the whereabouts of those records.88 The district
court distinguished this latter principle, established in Curcio v. United
States," on the grounds that the witness in Curcio appeared before the
grand jury pursuant to a personal subpoena and not in his capacity as
the records custodian. This distinction did not impress the Eleventh
Circuit. The court concluded that the fact that the subpoena in Curcio
was addressed to the witness personally, rather than to the corporation,
was not material to the Supreme Court's holding. 7 Rather, the
Supreme Court clearly created a distinction between the act of production, which cannot be avoided, and giving oral testimony, which is

78.
79.
1987).
80.
81.
82.
83.

Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury No. 86-3 (Will Roberts Corp.), 816 F.2d 569 (11th Cir.
87 F.3d 1198 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1199.
Id. at 1200.
Id.

84. Id.
85. 1d at 1201.
86. 354 U.S. 118 (1957).
87. 87 F.3d at 1202.
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subject to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 9 '
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit reversed."'
Also during the survey period, the Supreme Court held that communications between a patient and psychotherapist are privileged under Rule
501. 90

VI. ARTICLE VI: WITNESSES
Federal Rule of Evidence 610 prohibits the use of religion to impeach
a witness's credibility.9 However, as illustrated in United States v.
Beasley," Rule 610 does not render evidence of religious beliefs
generally inadmissible. In Beasley, defendants were convicted of
racketeering charges arising from the activities of their religious cult.
Central to the government's case was defendants' manipulation of
religious beliefs to exhort their followers to commit crimes. Accordingly,
the district court admitted extensive evidence of the defendants' religious
beliefs and practices."
This evidence, involving as it did racist
demagoguery, was highly prejudicial to the defense. The Eleventh
Circuit acknowledged that religious beliefs are not admissible to impeach
a witness's credibility, but also acknowledged that such beliefs are
admitted when probative of an issue in a criminal prosecution.9 Here,
evidence of defendants' religious beliefs was "highly relevant to the jury's
understanding of the existence, motives, and objectives of the ...
conspiracy and the means by which it was conducted." 5 Accordingly,
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions."
VII.

ARTICLE VII: OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY

As discussed in previous surveys, the Supreme Court held in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.' that the Federal Rules of
Evidence preempted decades of court decisions governing the admission
of expert testimony." Because the Court in Daubert did not enunciate
a "definitive checklist or test," but rather structured a loose framework

88. Id.
89. Id. at 1199.
90. Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996).
91.

FED. R. EviD. 610.

92. 72 F.3d 1518 (11th Cir. 1996).
93. Id. at 1524-25.
94. Id. at 1527.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1530.
97. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
98. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 45 MERCER L. REv. 1291, 1298-99 (1994); Marc T.
Treadwell, Evidence, 46 MERCER L. REv. 1377, 1385 (1995).
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to be applied by district judges," it seemed clear that the true effect of
the decision would likely be unknown until decisions made their way up
the appellate ladder. This has proved to be the case, and during the
current survey, the Eleventh Circuit rendered its most important
decision to date interpreting Daubert. This decision merits detailed
discussion.
In Joiner u. General Electric Co.,"9' plaintiff alleged that his lung
cancer was caused by exposure to PCBs and brought suit against the
parties allegedly responsible for his PCB exposure. Defendants moved
for summary judgment and the district court granted summary
judgment after concluding that plaintiff's expert testimony was
inadmissible.1 1 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that
Daubert established a "gatekeeper" role for district courts in assessing
the admissibility of expert testimony.
This "gatekeeping" role calls for the trial judge to make a "preliminary
assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is scientifically valid, i.e., whether it is reliable; and whether
that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in
issue," i.e., whether it is relevant to the issue involved. Proffered
scientific evidence must satisfy both prongs to be admissible."°
As gatekeeper, the district court must first examine the reasoning or
methodology undergirding the expert's opinion and assess whether it is
sufficiently reliable."0 3 However, the district court must "be careful not
to cross the line between deciding whether the expert's testimony is
based on 'scientifically valid principles' and deciding upon the correctness of the expert's conclusions." °4 Second, the district court must
determine whether the methodology or reasoning assists the trier of fact
in understanding the matter at issue. 10 5
At that point, the Eleventh Circuit took an interesting turn. Many
have thought that Daubert heightened the level of scrutiny for expert
evidence, and the gatekeeper role assigned to district judges increased
their authority to dispatch experts from the courtroom. Not so, said the
Eleventh Circuit. On the contrary, the Supreme Court intended in
"Daubertto loosen the strictures of [the common law 'general acceptance'
test] and make it easier to present legitimate conflicting views of experts

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
78 F.3d 524 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 528.
Id. at 530 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 580).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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for the jury's consideration." e It is no longer necessary that expert
evidence satisfy the "general acceptance" test.' 7 Rather, it is only
necessary that the evidence be "scientifically legitimate, and not 'junk
science' or mere speculation.""~ Certainly in this role judges are not
to assume the role of juries and weigh facts. "Keeping Daubert's lower
threshold
in mind," the Eleventh Circuit turned to the facts of Joiner.109
The Eleventh Circuit's statement of the standard of admissibility
arguably presaged its ultimate conclusion. Although acknowledging that
rulings on admissibility of evidence are subject to the abuse of discretion
standard, the court noted that the Federal Rules of Evidence favored the
admissibility of expert testimony and "appl[ied] a particularly stringent
n
standard of review to the trial judge's exclusion of expert testimony."
Moreover, the district court's interpretation of a rule of evidence is not
subject to the abuse of discretion standard, but rather presents a
question of law subject to plenary review."'
Applying the first prong of Daubert,the Eleventh Circuit proceeded to
determine whether the district court properly identified the bases of the
experts' opinions and whether the methods, procedures, and information
used by the experts were reliable. Upon reviewing these bases, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that "each utilized scientifically reliable
methods and procedures in gathering and assimilating all of the relevant
information in forming their respective opinions."" 2 The Eleventh
Circuit, focusing on the district court's conclusion that "the studies
simply do not support the experts' opinion that PCBs more probably than
not promoted Joiner's lung cancer," criticized the district court for ruling
on the correctness of the experts' opinions rather than on their
reliability. 3

The second prong of Daubert essentially involves a relevancy
analysis-whether the experts' reasoning and methodology fit the facts
of the case. The district court concluded, in part, that the experts'
opinions were not relevant because the experts assumed that Joiner was
exposed to furans and dioxins, derivatives of PCBs. The district court
apparently concluded that plaintiff's experts' opinions were contingent

106. Id.
107. Id

108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 529.
111. Id

112. Id. at 532.

113. Id. at 524 (quoting Joiner v. General Elec. Co., 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1326 (N.D. Ga.
1994)).
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upon exposure to furans and dioxins and because there was insufficient
evidence to establish such exposure, summary judgment on this issue
was appropriate. The Eleventh Circuit's review of the evidence
established, at least to its satisfaction, that the experts' opinions were
not necessarily contingent upon exposure to furans and dioxins." 4 In
any event, the Eleventh Circuit found evidence, based upon one expert's
testimony that conditions existed that would have led to the breakdown
of PCBs into furans or dioxins, that plaintiff was exposed to those
toxins." 5 Thus, this was an issue of disputed fact and could not be
resolved by summary judgment.
In a special concurrence, Judge Birch agreed that the district court's
role is limited to establishing that expert opinions have some minimal
level of reliability and probative value.11 It is not the role of district
courts, Judge Birch wrote, to weigh the evidence." 7
Judge Smith, in dissent, sharply criticized the majority from start to
finish, beginning with the majority's statement of the standard of review
which Judge Smith felt was not sufficiently "precise.""' Although
Judge Smith agreed that the exclusion of expert testimony required a
"particularly stringent" review on appeal, this did not change the abuse
of discretion standard."9 Rather, this simply meant that the court
should undertake a searching review of the record but continue to apply
the abuse of discretion standard. 20 And while he agreed that the
question of whether the trial court applied the proper Daubert standard
was a question of law subject to plenary or de novo review,12' the
question of whether the district court properly concluded that the
satisfied Daubert is subject to the abuse of discretion
proffered evidence
22
standard.1

Next, Judge Smith criticized the majority for examining the proffered
expert testimony as a whole rather than examining separately each
proffered opinion. Thus, for example, the opinions that furans and
dioxins were present and that furans and dioxins caused plaintiff's

114. Id at 529.
115. Id. at 528.

116. Id. (Birch, J., concurring specially).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 535 (Smith, J., dissenting).
119. I
120. Id;
121. Actually, Judge Smith criticized the use of the term "de novo" for not accurately
describing the review process. He preferred the phrase "complete and independent review."
I

at 536.
122. Id.
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cancer should be analyzed separately."2 The district court properly
examined each opinion and the majority unfairly criticized the district
court for not viewing the bases of the experts' opinions as a whole.'
Judge Smith's apparent point was that the proponent of the evidence
should shoulder the burden of proving, for example, that each study
supports the particular opinion rather than "bombard[ing] the court with
innumerable studies and then, with blue smoke and sleight of hand,
leap[ing] to the conclusion."' 25 This point, that the party producing the
evidence should be prepared to support it, proved to be the central theme
of Judge Smith's dissent.
With regard to the majority's conclusion that the district court abused
its discretion when it concluded that there was insufficient evidence to
establish that plaintiff was exposed to furans or dioxins and, in
particular, that plaintiff failed to show that PCBs were exposed to
conditions that would have produced furans and dioxins, Judge Smith
returned to his point that the proponent of the expert testimony must
point to the facts establishing that the evidence satisfies Daubert.'2
Although Judge Smith conceded that the majority found a "minor
passage" from one expert's affidavit stating that such conditions were
present, he did not feel that the district court should be reversed for
"overlooking [this] minor passage."127 Noting that plaintiff did not cite
this evidence at the district court, or on appeal, and that it "would have
been forever lost had it not been for the diligent, searching eye of the
majority,"28 Judge Smith did not think it fair to castigate the district
court for not conducting its own exacting search.
I am not prepared to encourage litigants to inundate the courts with
raw data and force the courts to process the data to determine why
certain evidence is admissible. The litigants and their experts should
know their evidence better 1 than anyone-they should be their own
advocates for its admission.

2

Thus, Judge Smith concluded that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it determined that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden
of proving that the experts' opinions that furans and dioxins were
present satisfied Daubert.'" For the same reason, their opinions that
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127.
128.
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130.

Id. at 537.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 538.
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plaintiff's cancer was caused by exposure to furans and dioxins did not
"fit"the case, and thus was not relevant and failed to satisfy the second
3
prong of Daubert."
With regard to the district court's alternative ground for summary
judgment-that the studies relied upon by the experts did not fit the
facts of the case, and thus were not relevant, Judge Smith would also
Examining the studies, Judge Smith again concluded that
affirm.1
plaintiffs simply failed to meet their burden. "It is incumbent on the
proponent of scientific evidence to fill the analytical gap between a
proffered study and the particular facts of the case"" and plaintiffs
did not meet this burden. With regard to the majority's focus on the
district court's statement that the studies "'do not support the experts'
position that PCBs more probably than not promoted Joiner's lung
cancer,'"' Judge Smith thought the majority was simply too picky.
"By directing attention away from the trial court's choice of terminology
and towards its actual analysis, I conclude that the trial court did not
The actual
abuse its discretion in ruling each study inadmissible."'
analysis, Judge Smith wrote, showed that the trial court did not assess
the correctness of the experts' opinions but simply whether they "fit" the
facts of the case."
The disagreement between the majority and the dissent regarding the
precise details of proper Daubert analysis notwithstanding, Joiner is
most significant for its pronouncement that Daubert expands the scope
of permissible expert testimony. However, if the vigorous debate
between the majority and the dissent is any indication, Joiner undoubtedly will not be the last word'on this issue.
VIII. ARTICLE VIII: HEARSAY
For only the second survey period since the author has been analyzing
Eleventh Circuit decisions, the Eleventh Circuit rendered no significant
decision addressing the inherent conflict between the admission of
hearsay evidence and the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment.
Interestingly, the first time was during the previous survey. However,
this conflict lingers on the edges of every criminal case in which evidence
from an unavailable declarant is admitted, and criminal law practitio-
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132.
133.
134.
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136.
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Id.
Id.at 539.
Id. (quoting Joiner, 864 F. Supp. at 1326).
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ners should keep abreast of the Eleventh Circuit's treatment of this
issue. These decisions are chronicled in past survey articles.
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) provides that. a statement is not hearsay if it is
"consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an
express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or
improper influence or motive."18 In last year's survey," the author
discussed the Supreme Court's decision in 7bme v. United States,'
resolving a conflict among the circuits with regard to Rule 801(dXl)(B).
The Eleventh Circuit had long recognized that a prior consistent
statement could be admitted pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) even though
the prior statement was made after the declarant developed a motive to
fabricate. " ° However, in Tome, the Supreme Court held that a prior
consistent statement is not admissible to rebut a charge of recent
fabrication unless the statement was made before the alleged fabrication
was made."'
During the current survey, the Eleventh Circuit addressed this issue
4 2 In Paradies,the district court, before
in United States v. Paradies.'
the Supreme Court's decision in Tome, held that prior consistent
statements made after the alleged motivation to fabricate arose were
admissible pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1)(B). On appeal, the parties agreed
that, in view of the subsequent decision in Tome, this determination was
error. However, the Eleventh Circuit nevertheless affirmed, because in
its view, the evidence was not offered to prove the truth of the matters
asserted in the statements but rather was offered to rehabilitate the
witness's testimony."
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
defendants' convictions.'
Rule 803(3) provides that a statement evidencing a declarant's "state
of mind, motion, sensation, or physical condition" is admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule." In United States v. Tokars," Rule
803(3) proved to be an effective weapon for the prosecution. In Tokars,
a highly publicized drug and racketeering case involving an Atlanta
attorney who allegedly contracted for the murder of his wife, the district
court admitted numerous statements by the wife to friends and relatives.
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FED. R. Evm. 801(dXl)(B).
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These statements generally concerned the wife's desire to divorce
defendant and her belief that she could gain custody of her children
because she had documents incriminating defendant. Defendant argued
that a homicide victim's state of mind is not generally relevant, and
should only be admitted when a defendant raises a defense of selfdefense, suicide, or accidental death. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed,
concluding that the wife's state of mind was relevant to defendant's
motive to kill."4 The Eleventh Circuit apparently was satisfied that
the evidence established defendant was sufficiently aware of his wife's
state of mind to provide him with this motive. Accordingly, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed. 14
IX.

ARTICLE IX: CONTENTS OF WRITINGS, RECORDINGS, AND

PHOTOGRAPHS

The best evidence rule of the Federal Rules of Evidence is found in the
eight rules set forth in Article X. Although the best evidence rule is
often cited as the basis for any objection to the use of a copy of a
document or to testimony related to a document, the actual application
of the best evidence rule is relatively narrow. For example, in United
States v. Castro,49 a witness testified that a local government received
in excess of ten thousand dollars in federal grants. Defendants
contended that the best evidence rule barred this testimony and that the
prosecution should have tendered documents itemizing federal funds
received. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, noting that Rule 1002 applies
when a party seeks to establish the contents of documents."W Here,
the government simply sought to prove that the county received
substantially more than ten thousand dollars in federal grants, and not
other
necessarily the exact amount or details surrounding those and
15 2
grants.'' Therefore, the best evidence rule was not implicated.
In United States v. Bueno-Sierra,' the Eleventh Circuit addressed
a recurring issue in the application of the business records exception to
the rule against hearsay.'" In Bueno-Sierra, the district court admitted a document prepared by one company and maintained in the records
of a second company on the basis of the testimony of a records custodian

147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 1535.
Id. at 1542.
89 F.3d 1443 (11th Cir. 1996).
I. at 1455.

151. Id.
152. Id.
153. 99 F.3d 375 (11th Cir. 1996).
154. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).

1626

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

from the second company. Defendants contended that the government
could not establish the elements of the business records exception
because the custodian had no knowledge of who prepared the documents.
The district court admitted the documents on the basis of the Eleventh
Circuit's decision in Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Healthdyne, Inc., a
decision discussed in a previous survey.'" The Eleventh Circuit,
however, had vacated its decision in Baxter Healthcare because the
parties withdrew their appeal,"6 7 and presumably for this reason, the
Eleventh Circuit did not rely on its initial opinion in Baxter Healthcare
in deciding Bueno-Sierra.
Nevertheless, the reference to BaxterHealthcareis interesting because
the Eleventh Circuit in Baxter Healthcaredistinguished its decision in
T Harris Young & Associates v. Marquette Electronics,'" a decision
also addressed in a previous survey.'"
In T. Harris Young, the
Eleventh Circuit held that out-of-court statements of customers
recounting disparaging comments allegedly made by defendant
employees were not admissible under the business records exception
because it was not the regular course of the customer's business to
report to defendant's employees." 6 In Baxter Healthcare,the Eleventh
Circuit distinguished T Harris Young on the grounds that the out-ofcourt declarants were not acting in the regular course of their business.""1 At that time, the author suggested that the difference between
T HarrisYoung and Baxter Healthcare,both of which involved customer
complaints, was that counsel in Baxter Healthcarewas astute enough to
elicit testimony that the complaining customers were acting in the
regular course of their respective businesses, although it seemed that
this testimony would be hearsay. 6 2
In Bueno-Sierra, it seemed that the documents at issue suffered from
the same defect as the customer complaints in T HarrisYoung, where
there was no evidence that the company whose custodian tendered the
documents prepared the documents or had knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the preparation of the documents. However, the
Eleventh Circuit held that the business records exception is not limited
to documents about which the business has firsthand knowledge of the
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facts sought to be proved by the admission of the documents.'"
Rather, it is sufficient to establish "that it was the business practice of
the recording entity to obtain such information from persons with
personal knowledge and the business practice of the proponent to
The
maintain the records produced by the recording entity."'"
Eleventh Circuit did acknowledge that 803(6) does not necessarily cure
double hearsay problems and "each link in the chain of possession must
satisfy the requirements of the business records exception or some other
exception to the hearsay rule."' Here, the custodian testified that the
documents in question were regularly maintained in his company's office
and that other companies regularly submitted such documents to his
company. Finally, the custodian testified, although the basis of this
knowledge was not stated, that these companies personally prepare the
documents in question. Based on these facts, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that the district court properly admitted the documents
pursuant to the business records exception."
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